

The evolution, essence and institutional determination of european parliamentary democracies

The article is dedicated to analysing the evolution, essence and institutional determination of European parliamentary democracies. The author argued that all democratic political regimes based on characteristics of the executive power delegation and responsibility to the popularly elected institutions should be divided into parliamentary and presidential democracies. The researcher noticed that parliamentary democracy is the prevailing format of interinstitutional relations in Europe and trace their history from the end of the XVII century, expanding statistically and quantitatively in the XIX and XX centuries. The author also argued that European parliamentary democracies in their construction of delegation and responsibility, which is determined with the agency theory, revolve around the institution of political parties.

Keywords: democratic regime, parliamentary democracy, party, parliament, government, elections, people, agent, principal, Europe.

Еволюція, сутність та інституційна детермінація європейських парламентських демократій

У статті проаналізовано еволюцію, сутність та інституційну детермінацію європейських парламентських демократій. Аргументовано, що всі демократичні політичні режими доцільно на підставі особливостей делегування повноважень і відповідальності виконавчої влади перед всенародно обраними установами поділяти на парламентські демократії і президентські демократії. Помічено, що парламентські демократії є превалюючим форматом міжінституційних відносин у країнах Європи і ведуть свою історію з кінця XVII століття, розширюючись статистично і кількісно у XIX та XX ст. Прослідковано, що європейські парламентські демократії у конструкції делегування повноважень і відповідальності, детермінованих теорією агентських відносин, обертаються навколо інституту політичної партії.

Ключові слова: демократичний режим, парламентська демократія, партія, парламент, уряд, вибори, народ, агент, принципал, Європа.

Political and institutional experience of late 20th – early 21st century, as well as the political scientists A. Lijphart¹, A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub and F. Limongi² shows that the phenomenon of democracy has been approbated across all continents, though it has been implemented in different ways. It is no wonder, as since the 20th century and till nowadays the issue of democracy determination, its varieties and institutional determinants has not acquired the unified form. It can be traced back due to the appeals to classical and novel scientific studies, dedicated to the problem of democratic political regimes and their diversity, especially concerning the research carried out by: M. Ostrogorski³, J. Bryce⁴, H. Finer⁵, J. Schumpeter⁶, R. Dahl⁷, K. Loewenstein⁸, D. Verney⁹, W. Steffani¹⁰, W. Niskanen¹¹, B. Powell¹², A. Lijphart¹³, G. Sartori¹⁴, P. Dunleavy¹⁵, T. Moe and M. Caldwell¹⁶, D. Wittman¹⁷, A. Stepan and C. Skach¹⁸, D. Mueller¹⁹, B. Manin²⁰, R. Elgie²¹, A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub and F. Limongi²², A. Kaiser²³ and others. Nevertheless, it has been gradually argued, even in these works (though to a variable degree), that depending on a form and governing system (namely, presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary) and peculiarities of delegated powers and responsibility to the nationally elected institutions (for instance, responsible only to a head of a state, or both to a president and parliament, or just to a parliament), that is, on the basis of various institutional determinations, all democratic regimes must be divided into presidential and

- ¹ A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.
- ² A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, F. Limongi, *Democracy and Development*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- ³ M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties: The United States*, Wyd. Macmillan 1907.
- ⁴ J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan, 1921.; J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies: Vol. 1*, Wyd. Cosimo, Inc. 2008.; J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies: Vol. 2*, Wyd. Cosimo, Inc. 2008.
- ⁵ H. Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, Wyd. Methuen 1931.
- ⁶ J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Harper & Brothers 1942.; J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Routledge 2013.
- ⁷ R. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1956.; R. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory, Expanded Edition*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1956.; R. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1971.
- ⁸ K. Loewenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1957.
- ⁹ D. Verney, *The Analysis of Political Systems*, Wyd. Routledge & Kegan Paul 1959.; D. Verney, *The Analysis of Political Systems*, Wyd. Routledge 2013.
- ¹⁰ W. Steffani, *Parlamentarische und präsidiale Demokratie*, Wyd. Westdeutscher Verlag 1979.
- ¹¹ W. Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*, Wyd. Aldine-Atherton 1974.
- ¹² B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.
- ¹³ A. Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984.; A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.
- ¹⁴ G. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited: The Contemporary Debate*, Wyd. Chatham House 1987.; G. Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.
- ¹⁵ P. Dunleavy, *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice*, Wyd. Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991.
- ¹⁶ T. Moe, M. Caldwell, *The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems*, "Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics" 1994, vol 150, nr 1, s. 171–195.
- ¹⁷ D. Wittman, *The Myth of Democratic Failure*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1995.
- ¹⁸ A. Stepan, C. Skach, *Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism*, "World Politics" 1993, vol 46, nr 1, s. 1–22.
- ¹⁹ D. Mueller, *Constitutional Democracy*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1996.
- ²⁰ B. Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.
- ²¹ R. Elgie, *The Classification of Democratic Regime Types: Conceptual Ambiguity and Contestable Assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219–238.; R. Elgie, *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999.
- ²² A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, F. Limongi, *Democracy and Development*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- ²³ A. Kaiser, *Types of Democracy?*, "Journal of Theoretical Politics" 1997, vol 9, nr 4, s. 419–444.

parliamentary. In parliamentary democracies the majority of citizens assume the parliamentary way of government formation and responsibility to be a legitimized instrument and mechanism of representation of the people, while in presidential democracies such mechanism/instrument is represented by the presidential way of government formation and responsibility.

Presidential and parliamentary democracies have different parameters of inter-institutional relations and various patterns/features of legitimacy of state authority, and that is why they are characterized by non-identical perception of the procedural essence and principles of democracy itself. And this, in fact, variously influences the interpretation of the essence and determination of different political (authoritative) institutions, their interrelations within political systems, and consequently, it is in different ways represented in scientific research, dedicated to the institutional determination, investigation of evolution, basic nature and varieties of presidential and parliamentary democracies. Especially, it can be noted in case of European democratic countries, which mainly (it would be mentioned below in detail) are the examples of parliamentary democracies²⁴. It has resulted into a number of scientific studies, which specify the main entity and institutional determination of parliamentary democracy itself and its varieties/models. Among the most famous research, devoted to the problem of comprehension and interpretation of the notion of parliamentary democracy and its empirical essence, one can single out the following political researchers and their findings: J. Mill²⁵, L. Lowell²⁶, K. Schmitt²⁷, H. Kelsen²⁸, F. Ogg²⁹, K. von Beyme³⁰, A. King³¹, K. Kluxen³², E. Schütt-Wetschky³³, M. Laver and N. Schofield³⁴, D. Judge³⁵, A. Lijphart³⁶, J. Huber³⁷, D. Baron³⁸, P. Esaiasson and S. Holmberg³⁹, H. D. Klingemann, R. Hofferbert and I. Budge⁴⁰, K. Strøm⁴¹, J. Woldendorp, H. Keman and I. Budge⁴² and many others.

²⁴ K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *The (moral) hazards of parliamentary democracy*, [w:] F. Gilardi, D. Braun (eds.), *Delegation in Contemporary Democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2006, s. 27.

²⁵ J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism. Liberty. Representative Government*, Wyd. Dent 1861.

²⁶ L. Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, Wyd. Longmans, Green, and Co. 1896.

²⁷ C. Schmitt, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus*, Wyd. Duncker & Humblot 1923.

²⁸ H. Kelsen, *Das Problem der Parlamentarismus*, Wyd. Braumüller 1926.

²⁹ F. Ogg, *English Government and Politics*, Wyd. Macmillan 1936.

³⁰ K. von Beyme, *Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa*, Wyd. Piper 1970.

³¹ A. King, *Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany*, «Legislative Studies Quarterly» 1976, vol 1, nr 1, s. 11–36.

³² K. Kluxen, *Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus*, Frankfurt am Main 1983.

³³ E. Schütt-Wetschky, *Grundtypen parlamentarischer Demokratie*, Wyd. Freiburg 1984.

³⁴ M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

³⁵ D. Judge, *The Parliamentary State*, Wyd. Sage 1993.

³⁶ A. Lijphart, *The Virtues of Parliamentarism: But Which Kind of Parliamentarism?*, [w:] H. Chehabi, A. Stepan (eds.), *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Studies*, Wyd. Westview Press 1995.

³⁷ J. Huber, *Rationalizing Parliament*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

³⁸ D. Baron, *Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments*, «American Political Science Review», vol 92, nr 3, s. 593–609.

³⁹ P. Esaiasson, S. Holmberg, *Representation from Above: Members of Parliament and Representative Democracy in Sweden*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1996.

⁴⁰ H.-D. Klingemann, R. Hofferbert, I. Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, Wyd. Westview Press 1994.

⁴¹ K. Strøm, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, «European Journal of Political Research» 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 261–289.

⁴² J. Woldendorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998)*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000.

In the works elaborated by these and other scientists it has been argued that the first parliamentary democracies in the world are the United Kingdom and Sweden⁴³. In particular, F. Norton identifies 1688 as the beginning of parliamentary domination, when during the conflict between the British parliament and King James II the former won, and the latter had to leave the country. After that in 1689 the parliament elected the new King – William of Orange, – but limited his powers and authority to a great extent⁴⁴. Nevertheless, as L. Lowell⁴⁵ states, the roots of parliamentarianism, as well as parliamentary democracy can be traced back since 1693, when the King agreed to the House of Commons' political will and appointed the cabinet composed of Whigs, which had the majority in the lower chamber of the British parliament. Since that time the parliamentary democracy in the United Kingdom had started its gradual development and achieved its modern form in the 19th century, when the Reform Act of 1832 was adopted, the "Crown" had little influence on government formation and appointment, while supervisory powers were given to the House of Commons⁴⁶. Since 1867–1884 after popularizing suffrage, the process of government formation became directly associated with parliamentary elections and elections of political parties to the parliament, as a result the idea of the governmental directed parliament in the United Kingdom has been institutionalized⁴⁷. In case of Sweden, the rudiments of parliamentary democracy were approved in 1719–1772 during the so-called "The Age of Liberty"⁴⁸, when the King of Sweden lost his "almighty" status in favor of the parliament – Riksdag, which at that time consisted of 4 chambers. The core of the executive branch became not a King, but the King's council. As a result, a monarch could personally appoint ministers from the King's Council (government), but only on the basis of three candidates, offered by the Riksdag⁴⁹. In Sweden at the end of 30s of the 18th century, notes L. Linnarsson⁵⁰, appeared something like modern vote of no confidence in the government (be more precise, some ministers from the government). Only in 1772 after the King's death, his successor organized an armed rebellion and destroyed any rudiments of parliamentarianism and cast Sweden back to the absolute monarchy⁵¹.

At the end of the 18th – beginning of the 19th century the rudiments of parliamentary democracy started appearing (though not systematically) across the British Empire and other countries of continental Europe. Thus, in 1792 in France the doctrine of government ministers' responsibility to the

⁴³ W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, Wyd. Fontana/Collins 1867; J. Goldsworthy, *The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999; D. Judge, *The Parliamentary State*, Wyd. Sage 1993; K. Kluxen, *Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus*, Frankfurt am Main 1983; J. Mackintosh, *The British Cabinet*, Wyd. Methuen 1968; M. Roberts, *The Age of Liberty: Sweden, 1719–1772*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986.

⁴⁴ P. Norton, *The Commons in Perspective*, Wyd. Blackwell 1981, s. 12.

⁴⁵ L. Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, Wyd. Longmans, Green, and Co. 1896, s. 3.

⁴⁶ G. Cox, *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.

⁴⁷ P. Norton, *The Commons in Perspective*, Wyd. Blackwell 1981, s. 16, 19–20.

⁴⁸ M. Roberts, *The Age of Liberty: Sweden, 1719–1772*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986.

⁴⁹ M. Metcalf, *Russia, England and Swedish Party Politics 1762–1766: The interplay between Great Power Diplomacy and Domestic Politics during Sweden's Age of Liberty*, Wyd. Almqvist & Wiksell International 1977.

⁵⁰ L. Linnarsson, *Riksrådens licentiering: en studie i frihetstidens parlamentarism, Issues 15–17*, Wyd. Almqvist och Wiksells boktryck 1943.

⁵¹ S. Hadenius, *Riksdagen. En svensk historia*, Wyd. Riksdagen 1994.

parliament was introduced. Most European countries tested the similar procedure only in the middle of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century, when the number of parliamentary democracies increased. For instance, the institution of parliamentary responsibility of the ministers appeared in 1830 in Belgium and Luxembourg, in 1848 in the Netherlands, in 1867 in Italy, in 1869 in Spain, in 1884 in Norway, in 1901 in Denmark, and after the First World War in Austria, Finland, Germany, Iceland, and Ireland etc.⁵². In some parliamentary democracies at first appeared the institution of partial electoral law, and in others appeared the institution of full electoral law⁵³.

Next wave of parliamentary democracies increase in Europe took place after the Second World War⁵⁴, as a result of which parliamentary democracy introduced itself as a stable type of political regime, despite the fact that within its frames there were several examples of return to authoritarian regimes⁵⁵. In particular, one can recall the examples of parliamentary collapse in Austria, Spain, Italy and Germany and some other countries in the first half of the 21st century, and the examples of introduction of parliamentary democracy in Greece and Spain⁵⁶. Finally, the accomplishment of parliamentary democracies establishment in Europe took place after the collapse of the USSR, especially due to Central-Eastern European countries.

It allows us to make a unilateral and an implicit conclusion that as of 2015 among all European countries (we do not separately analyze various microstates, namely Andorra, San-Marino, Monaco, the Vatican, Lichtenstein, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta) parliamentary democracies (however with different constitutional government systems, and this fact requires additional study, devoted to types/models of parliamentary democracies) are represented by: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Finland, France, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Montenegro and Sweden. It is notable, that in Europe parliamentary democracies are exclusively represented by the EU members and some countries, which are inalienably associated with the EU and “the free-trade area”. All these countries culturally, civilizational, geopolitically and geographically form Western and Central-Eastern Europe. Moreover, Western Europe comprises those countries, which are the EU members or have already been associated with the EU for more than fifteen years (since the Maastricht Treaty, entered into force on November 1, 1993) and Malta, and Central-Eastern Europe consists of the countries, which became the EU members over 2004–2007 and in 2013, as well as the countries, associated with the EU, being consolidated or semi-consolidated democracies. They are united by the

⁵² P. Gerlich, *The Institutionalization of European Parliaments*, [w:] A. Kornberg (ed.), *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. David McKay 1973, s. 100–101.; B. Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.

⁵³ J. Colomer, *Political Institutions: Democracy and Social Choice*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

⁵⁴ M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 39–41.; R. Rose, *Challenge to Governance: Studies in Overloaded Politics*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1980.

⁵⁵ A. Stepan, C. Skach, *Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism*, “World Politics” 1993, vol 46, nr 1, s. 1–22.; A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, F. Limongi, *Democracy and Development*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

⁵⁶ K. von Beyme, *Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa*, Wyd. Piper 1970.; J. Colomer, *Political Institutions: Democracy and Social Choice*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001, s. 217.

fact, that predominant influence on the processes of formation or pre-term termination of powers of the higher bodies of state executive authority belongs to the parliament or the head of a state or both of them. Taking this into consideration, one can point out the peculiar “chain” of delegating powers and responsibility, which is directed through various “veto-actors” at making all bodies of executive branch/governments subordinate, primarily and obligatory, to the bodies of legislative branch/parliaments (sometimes, however, to both parliaments and presidents).

Such conclusion is incorporated into the essence and institutional determination of European (and other) parliamentary democracies. The point is that nowadays all parliamentary democracies and their advantages and drawbacks are determined by political parties and their institutional, social-authoritative and political functions, what can be proved by the theory of agency relationship and principal-agent approach⁵⁷. It becomes clear due to the fact that parliamentary democracy as a type of representative democracy is determined by the “web” of various relations of delegating powers and responsibility. In such relations a “principal” (who initially possesses power) allows an “agent” (who acquires power) to act on their behalf. This, in accordance with the “agency relationship” theory, can be explained by several factors. Firstly, political society, any state in particular, is treated as “something limited”: it means that in every country political decisions are always “extensive”⁵⁸, that is take place not only at the national level, but also at the subnational and supra-national levels. Secondly, advantages/preferences of principals and agents are exogenous, that is delegation itself does not focus on the process of advantages/preferences formation. Thirdly, all principals and agents act rationally, considering the obtained information: it leads to the fact that all actors have already formed advantages/preferences as to their expected and potential results. Fourthly, principals face the problem of informational deficiency, but upon the sole condition that information is of critical importance as to decision making and delegation processes. Fifthly, politics is always hierarchical, and principals’ advantages or preferences are privileged. Therefore, agents’ roles are to offer principals the means, among which the latter will be able to choose, but not to make principals determine their political goals. This is under condition that one and the same person or organization in one case can be an agent and on other occasions can be a principal. However, turning to the representative democracy, in particular a parliamentary one, it should be noted, that such a basic characteristic as people’s sovereignty necessarily means regarding electorate (people) as the main/maximal principal⁵⁹. “Phenomenality” of the people’s sovereignty principle lies in the fact that supreme power is laid upon average citizens, who even in a democratic society use it directly rather rarely. But, people can delegate the right to make decisions

⁵⁷ T. Moe, *The New Economics of Organization*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1984, vol 28, nr 4, s. 739–777.; T. Moe, *The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy*, [w:] D. Mueller (ed.), *Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 455–480.; J. Pratt, R. Zeckhauser, *Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business*, Wyd. Harvard Business School Press 1985.; E. Furubotn, R. Richter, *Institutions and Economic Theory: An Introduction to and Assessment of the New Institutional Economics*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2000.

⁵⁸ M. Cohen, J. March, J. Olsen, *A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice*, “Administrative Science Quarterly” 1972, vol 17, nr 1, s. 1–25.; J. Bendor, T. Moe, K. Shotts, *Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research Program*, “American Political Science Review” 2001, vol 95, nr 1, s. 169–190.

⁵⁹ K. Ström, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 59–61.

concerning important issues to specialists, including politicians and officials, who are responsible for adoption and realization of the majority of social and state solutions⁶⁰. That is why, citizens delegate people's sovereignty to various representatives, in particular politicians and political organizations, first of all to political parties⁶¹.

In parliamentary democracies citizens/electorate delegate people's sovereignty to politicians on the basis of free and fair parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, democratic parliamentary elections are only the first step in the process of people's sovereignty delegation. Then, in accordance with the classic remark by J. Mill, there is an acute necessity to delegate powers from parliamentary politicians to officials and politicians in cabinets, i.e. from parliaments to governments⁶². According to the traditional representation, it regulates that parliaments in parliamentary democracies should not take administrative decisions, directly appoint government ministers and/or state officials, and unilaterally carry out legislative activity. Thus, J. Mill supports the model in conformance with which, parliaments have rather extended delegated powers and are limited by control over the executive branch and act as "arenas" for public discussions. Due to the very principles, modern parliamentary (including European ones) democracies, where nationally elected people's representatives (formally members of the legislative branch) delegate extended powers to the members of the executive branch, are structuralized. But the described logic of people's sovereignty delegation is not perfect and complex, even despite the fact that members of parliaments and cabinets consider themselves agents of their voters, they also have other roles, stipulated by the constitution. For instance, rather often in the constitutions of the countries, which are parliamentary democracies, parliamentary deputies are not representatives of their own voters, but the delegates of all citizens⁶³. One can observe that members of parliaments and governments are concurrently interpreted as representatives of principal constitutional rights and liberties. That is why, politicians and state officials, being simple agents, are restricted by their official duties and responsibility.

In general, it allows us to conclude, that parliamentary democracy is, in its ideally-typical form, a "chain" of delegating powers or duties and responsibility from electorate to final politicians and state officials, in which one can identify at least 4 discrete steps or delegation parts (such position is supported by K. Strøm, W. Müller and T. Bergman⁶⁴): 1) from electorate to the elected representatives (legislators, members of parliaments); 2) from legislators (members of the legislative branch)

⁶⁰ H. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, Wyd. University of California Press 1967, s. 209.; K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003.

⁶¹ R. Dahl, *After the Revolution?: Authority in a Good Society*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1970, s. 8, 30–31, 44–45.; B. Rasch, *Demokrati: Ideer og Organisering*, Wyd. Fagbokforlaget 2000.; D. Epstein, S. O'Halloran, *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.; W. Riker, *Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, Wyd. W. H. Freeman 1982.; K. Shepsle, M. Bonchek, *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*, Wyd. W. W. Norton 1997.; R. Niemi, H. Weisberg, *A Mathematical Solution for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting*, "Behavioral Science" 1968, vol 3, nr 4, s. 317–323.; W. Riker, P. Ordeshook, *Introduction to Positive Political Theory*, Wyd. Prentice Hall 1973.; M. Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1965.; K. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values*, Wyd. John Wiley 1966.

⁶² J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism. Liberty. Representative Government*, Wyd. Dent 1861, s. 249–250.

⁶³ B. Wessels, *Whom to Represent? Role Orientations of Legislators in Europe*, [w:] H. Schmitt, J. Thomassen (eds.), *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 209–234.; P. Esaiasson, S. Holmberg, *Representation from Above: Members of Parliament and Representative Democracy in Sweden*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1996.

⁶⁴ K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 64.

to the core of the executive branch, in particular to the head of the government (the Prime Minister); 3) from the Prime Minister to heads of various ministries and departments, which belong to the executive branch; 4) from heads of various ministries and departments, which belong to the executive branch, to the corresponding state officials. The attributes of power and responsibility delegation in parliamentary democracies differ from those in presidential democracies, for example, in several characteristics. Firstly, within the latter, delegation of the majority of authoritative powers and responsibility is indirect, as only voters (who are the main/maximal principals) directly elect their representatives to parliaments, whereas all other agents are elected indirectly or appointed at all and are only partially liable and responsible to citizens. Secondly, parliamentary democracy is interpreted as the maximally simple “chain” of delegating powers/duties and responsibility. The point is that at every link of the parliamentary delegation chain one principal delegates powers to another one. Thirdly, in parliamentary democracies delegation agents are liable and responsible only to the principals, who delegated them their powers. For instance, the cabinet is liable to the parliament or the parliament and head of state (but compulsory to the parliament) and a cabinet minister is liable to the head of the cabinet. Moreover, state officials also have one main principal, usually represented by the corresponding ministry of a department. However, delegation of powers and responsibility in parliamentary democracies is indirect, as a result of which one can observe delegation of powers and/or responsibility from one principal to one agent; from several non-competitive principals to one agent; from one principal to several non-competitive agents; from several non-competitive principals to several non-competitive agents. Though, it is compulsory upon the specific condition that the parliament will always be (despite other authoritative institutions) both a principal and an agent of delegating powers and responsibility⁶⁵.

Nonetheless, even regardless of relative simplicity of the “chain” of delegating powers/duties and responsibility in parliamentary democracies, the latter are determined by some difficulties, risks, problems and ambiguity of the very process of people’s sovereignty delegation. The point is that one cannot speak of constant and absolute confidence in politicians or agents and principals. That is why, danger of any delegation lies in the fact that it can be transformed into “renunciation”, when a person/organization (or a principal in general), who delegates powers to other persons/organizations (or agents in general) can lose their control over responsibility of the latter. It means that delegation in politics is not an exception. In due time, it was mentioned by R. Michels, who, being conscious of inevitability of delegating powers to party leaders within their parties, specified the risks of such delegation, as regardless of the fact that democracy is inconceivable without organization, the latter leads to domination of the elected ones over electorate, mandatories over creditors and representatives over delegators. Consequently, the main risk of political delegation in any parliamentary democracy is “oligarchization”⁶⁶. Another scientifically stipulated risk of political

⁶⁵ K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 65.

⁶⁶ R. Michels, C. Paul, S. Lipset, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, Wyd. Free Press 1968, s. 61, 365.

delegation is – a “descending” dependence of state officials upon cabinet ministers, which has already been mentioned by M. Weber⁶⁷. The researcher states that ministers are often interpreted as the so-called “dilettantes”, and state officials are usually seen as “experts”⁶⁸. Moreover, politicians can often pursue their personal goals and benefits, but not the people’s aims and interests, for whom they are agents of powers delegation⁶⁹.

Scholars are also concerned about the way of delegating powers in parliamentary democracies. All their observations can be divided into those, which state the loss of people’s importance of being the main principal, what can happen as a result of delegating powers to authoritative bodies, and those which argue, that due to the process of delegation, voters disclaim themselves as the representatives of the main role of people’s sovereignty representative/bearer. To the first group belong H.-D. Klingemann, R. Hofferbert and I. Budge⁷⁰, who claim that parliamentary democracies are mainly characterized by success and only partially by drawbacks. Among the less optimistic researchers one can name J. Schumpeter⁷¹ and W. Riker⁷², J. Sartori⁷³ and E. Schattschneider⁷⁴, who observe, that democratic delegation works only in case of the process “from elections to elections”. Such scholars as D. Mayhew⁷⁵ and M. Fiorina⁷⁶ express even greater pessimism than their colleagues do, noticing that due to elections there can appear some ways of manipulating the process of people’s sovereignty delegation. Moreover, people’s representatives can shirk their direct functions and obligations, be elected “mindlessly” (on the basis of commercials and popularity of the party they belong to etc.). Finally the most pessimistic approaches, within the abovementioned context, are expressed by B. Manin, A. Przeworski and S. Stokes⁷⁷, A. Downs⁷⁸ and W. Niskanen⁷⁹, who state that in parliamentary democracies the idea of delegation does not work at all, since politicians and state officials are autonomous, and citizens do not have real influence on their agents and agents’ actions. That is why, politicians and state officials can, at their own will, change the course of their action and operate, only and primarily, to pursue their personal interests. Therefore, it happens very often that politicians, who in general are electorate’s agents, whereas the latter is the main principal, act not

⁶⁷ M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundris der verstehenden Soziologie*, Bände 1–2, Mohr, s. 572–574.

⁶⁸ J. Lynn, A. Jay, *The Complete Yes, Minister: The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister*, Wyd. BBC Books 1989.

⁶⁹ B. Manin, A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, *Elections and Representation*, [w:] A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, B. Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 40.; F. McChesney, *Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1997, s. 35.

⁷⁰ H.-D. Klingemann, R. Hofferbert, I. Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, Wyd. Westview Press 1994.

⁷¹ J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Harper & Brothers 1942.

⁷² W. Riker, *Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, Wyd. W.H. Freeman 1982.

⁷³ G. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited: The Contemporary Debate*, Wyd. Chatham House 1987, s. 28–31, 86–89.

⁷⁴ E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America*, Wyd. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston 1960.

⁷⁵ D. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1974.

⁷⁶ M. Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1977.

⁷⁷ B. Manin, A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, *Elections and Representation*, [w:] A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, B. Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 40.

⁷⁸ A. Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Wyd. Little, Brown 1967.

⁷⁹ W. Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*, Wyd. Aldine-Atherton 1974.

just for maximization of social interests and welfare, but for achieving private goals and prosperity⁸⁰. Consequently, in the theory of agency relationship or in accordance with the principal-agent approach there is such a notion as “agency loss”. This is the difference between what a principal wants and what is executed by an agent. “Agency loss” is not a problem of delegating powers and responsibility in parliamentary democracies, only when both a principal and an agent acquire the same advantages/preferences or when a principal is absolutely aware of the agent’s actions. On the other hand, “agency loss” becomes a problem of parliamentary democracies, when both a principal and an agent have different advantages/preferences or when a principal is not fully conscious about the agent’s actions or when these actions are concealed. It can lead towards “unfavorable” choice (of agents, who do not possess required skills and advantages/preferences)⁸¹ and «moral risks» of parliamentary democracies, when an agent can function against the principal’s interests⁸².

Therefore, it becomes obvious that together with the delegation of powers/duties in parliamentary democracies (including European ones) gigantic attention is also focused on the mechanisms of agents’ liability and responsibility to principals. It means that if agents’ policy/activity is unsatisfactory or is in contradiction to the principals’ requirements, then agents/politicians must undergo a thorough check and in case of necessity can be dismissed from authority. For instance, governments are considered to be responsible, if citizens can distinguish between their representative and non-representative nature, and in such way can approve these governments. Thus, the “mechanism of responsibility” is a so-called “dependence card” for an agent from a principal, which is created on the basis of the process of evaluation and information about the results of specific politicians’ and state officials’ activity as to “citizens’ sanctions”⁸³. Accountability or responsibility means that a principal has at least two types of powers regarding each or all of his agents: the right to demand information concerning agents and their activity, the right to impose sanctions against agents. As a rule a principal obtains one of the “mechanisms of responsibility”, either the right to demand information about the agents and their activity or the right to impose sanctions against agents. Besides, realization of the “mechanisms of responsibility” regarding agents can occur in different ways, and at different stages of powers delegation from a principal to an agent⁸⁴: some instruments of liability/responsibility can be used only as the prognostic ones by principals to warn about the “agency loss”, but not as the factual ones (ex ante) – that is up to the moment of powers delegation from principals to agents (among the most commonly used one – is a vote of investiture to the

⁸⁰ A. Shleifer, R. Vishny, *The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1998.

⁸¹ J. Brehm, S. Gates, *Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1997, s. 202.; G. Parker, *Congress and the Rent-seeking Society*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1996.; J. Fearon, *Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance*, [w:] A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, B. Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation* Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 68.

⁸² R. Barro, *The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model*, “Public Choice” 1973, vol 14, nr 1, s. 19–42.; J. Ferejohn, *Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control*, “Public Choice” 1986, vol 50, nr 1, s. 5–25.

⁸³ B. Manin, A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, *Elections and Representation*, [w:] A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, B. Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 10.

⁸⁴ A. Lupia, *Delegation and its Perils*, [w:] K. Ström, W. Müller, T. Bergman (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003.; P. Aghion, J. Tirole, *Formal and Real Authority in Organizations*, “Journal of Political Economy” 1997, vol 105, nr 1, s. P. 1–29.; R. Kiewiet, M. McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1991.

expected government), and some after the process of powers delegation to agents, in accordance with the results of their factual activity (ex post) – (among the most commonly implemented ones are interpellation, procedure of ministers impeachment and vote of no confidence in the current parliament or refusal of confidence in the current parliament). Moreover, parliaments in course of their activity can also implement institutional constraints and checks, when bodies of the executive branch (government in particular) must undergo legal control and external audit. This practice is widely spread especially in the systems of constraints and counterbalance, but in any case is not limited to them. At the same time one should remember that in parliamentary democracies there is one more absolute instrument of liability and responsibility. This is parliamentary elections, which is used as a perspective (to elect politicians and officials) and a retrospective (to impose sanctions on the previously elected politicians and officials) instrument of all agents' responsibility to their crucial principal – the people. That is why, parliamentary elections in parliamentary democracies is the main institution which has double nature – it starts “delegation” of people's sovereignty and finishes responsibility test for all hierarchical agents to their main principal – the people⁸⁵. Moreover, the researchers mention, that on the basis of a diverse combination of agents' perspective and retrospective “mechanisms of responsibility” to their principals along with taking into consideration other institutional parameters of parliamentary democracies, the latter have not become the typical, unified and universal category, but still are diversified (what must be the subject to another specific scientific research, dedicated to types/models of parliamentary democracies).

Turning back to the abovementioned disposition, according to which all parliamentary democracies and their advantages and drawbacks are determined by political parties and their institutional, social-authoritative and political functions, we must observe, that the main institution of any parliamentary democracy is the government/cabinet. Theoretically, it is based on the idea of powerful civil society and influential political parties, which combine principals' and agents' advantages/preferences, in particular basic political institutions and establishments, and consequently is formed by a party or several parties, which are focused on policy making processes, are centralized and consolidated. Thus, any parliamentary democracy is mainly characterized by the position of the appropriateness of the party-parliament government, in other words the government, formed by parliamentary parties⁸⁶. It shows that the government phenomenon in parliamentary democracy is based on the party phenomenon, as a beneficial one for both all principals and agents of power-electoral institutions. The point is, that all political parties, which strive for being represented in power within parliamentary democracies must obligingly fulfill two main stimulation conditions. Firstly, they must ensure appropriate stimuli for state officials to make

⁸⁵ B. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000.; G. Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997, s. 156.; J. Schlesinger, *Political Parties and the Winning of Office*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1994.; D. Wittman, *The Myth of Democratic Failure*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1995.; J. Carey, *Term Limits and Legislative Representation*, Cambridge 1996.; W. Müller, *Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 309–333.

⁸⁶ G. Cox, *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.; W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, Wyd. Fontana/Collins 1867.

them adhere to discipline, required by political parties. Secondly, policy of solidarity, carried out by political parties among state officials in parliamentary democracies, must be efficient enough to let voters interpret political parties as informative and useful ones. Therefore, to make any party government effective, parties must in all ways promote legislators to realize the main political aims of their parties – reelection of parties, implementation of political power and achievement of political goals. At the same time, parties must be effective enough in terms of information and economy, to make their voters and adherents support them. The point is that electorate will ensure support to their parties only when they can put their political programs and governmental goals (in case, when they form governments) into practice. And this means that government activity within parliamentary democracies at the party level must inevitably resound with voters' inclinations⁸⁷. Consequently, in terms of parliamentary democracies political parties influence all links of the chain of delegating powers and responsibility. In particular, they conventionally acquire control over the course of powers and responsibility delegation from electorate to deputies, from deputies to the Prime Minister and so on. However, alongside with this political parties weaken the process of delegating powers and responsibility. As W. Müller acknowledges, parties, to a small extent, are able to maintain and control the final element of the chain of delegating powers, namely state officials and their behavior. The point is that the role of political parties is weakened in conjunction with the greater extension of the chain of delegating powers, i.e. in accordance with the increase of "informational asymmetry" and relevance of normative restrictions between principals and agents⁸⁸.

To make a conclusion, we prove that the phenomenon of parliamentary democracy is not a "blank" concept, as it is justified theoretically and evolutionary and is based on the considerable practical-empirical grounds, in particular in European countries. It is obvious, due to the fact, that nearly all European democracies are parliamentary. Their crucial institutions are represented by parties, party parliaments, and party governments respectively, which against each other are in direct relations as to delegating powers and responsibility. Besides, the crucial/basic principal of all parliamentary democracies is electorate/people, which initiates the chain of delegating powers to parliament, and later to government and state officials. However, responsibility in parliamentary democracies is incorporated into the relations of reverse order. All relations of delegating powers/duties and responsibility in parliamentary democracies take place around the institution of a political party. As the European institutional experience of the 19th – 21st century proves this relation has been constantly intensifying.

⁸⁷ R. Dalton, M. Wärttemberg, *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 249.; M. Palmer, *Toward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining Ministerial Responsibility*, "Journal of Law, Economics and Organization" 1995, vol 11, nr 1, s. 164–188.

⁸⁸ W. Müller, *Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 330.

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